This book is based on notes taken by A. Chernyaev, V. Medvedev, and G. Shakhnazarov at Politburo meetings and other closed conferences in the CPSU Central Committee between 1985 and 1991. These materials describe the beginning and development of perestroika policy, how problems were discussed, and the difficulties involved in finding optimal solutions. The reader can trace the evolution of the views of members of the USSR's highest governing body, the gradual escalation of difficulties during perestroika, and discern the reasons—both objective and subjective—for the waning of its initial momentum. They can also assess the role of various social, political, and national forces in the development of events—both those who attempted to halt destructive processes and save the Union, and those who, intentionally or unknowingly, contributed to it. These documents debunk the myths that have developed over the years, persistent stereotypes, and unfair conclusions—everything that prevents us from understanding not only the inevitability of perestroika, but also its true historical significance.

The book is addressed to historians and political scientists, students and teachers of higher education, as well as a wide range of readers interested in the history of our country.